Three different forrnalizations of concept-learning in logic (as well as some variants) are analyzed and related. It is shown that learning from interpretations reduces to learning from entailment, which in turn reduces to learning from satisfiability. The implications of this result for inductive logic programming and computational learning theory are then discussed, and guidelines for choosing a problem-setting are formulated. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.
Introduction
Various formalisations of concept-learning in logic have been proposed, e.g. learning from interpretations [ 1, 7, 30] , learning from entailment [ 151, and several inductive logic programming settings [ 10,12,14,24, 3 I]. These formalizations differ in their representation of examples and the corresponding membership function or coverage notion, which determines whether an example is covered by a concept. At present, it is an open question as to what the relation among these different formalizations is. This question has been raised in different forms and in different contexts. Firstly, in computational learning theory, [ 1, 2, 15] have wondered what the general relation is between learning from interpretations and learning from entailment, and which setting should be used for which type of learning problem. Secondly, in inductive logic programming it is unclear how systems such as FOIL [29] and Golem [25] , which learn from entailment, relate to systems such as ICL [9] and Claudien [6] , which learn from interpretations. Furthermore, several variants have been proposed of these settings [ 11,3 11. Thirdly, though computational learning theory and attribute-value learning techniques typically learn from interpretations, inductive logic programming has mainly addressed learning from entailment, which indicates that answers to the open question may also increase our understanding of the relation between inductive logic programming and attribute value learning. Fourthly, PAC-learning studies of inductive logic programming such as [ 3, 7] have also left open the question as to whether learning from interpretations allows to PAC-learn classes of concepts that are not learnable from entailment.
This paper contributes answers to the open questions raised above. More specifically, it will be shown that learning from interpretations reduces to learning from entailment, which in turn reduces to learning from satisfiability. Learning from satisfiability is a more recent setting that generalizes the other settings. In this setting, examples and hypotheses are both full clausal theories.
It will also be shown that there exist propositional classes such as k-CNF that are PAC-learnable from interpretations, but that are not efficiently learnable from entailment or from satisfiability. The implications of this result for inductive logic programming, computational learning theory and attribute value learning are then analyzed. Furthermore, practical suggestions for choosing the right problem-setting are formulated. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews some basic notions in logic; Section 3 introduces the different formalisations of concept-learning in clausal logic and investigates the relation among them; Section 4 discusses the implications of this relation for computational learning theory (this section may be skipped by the casual reader less interested in theory); Section 5 touches upon related work, and finally, Section 6 concludes.
Logic
We first review some standard concepts from the predicate calculus (see e.g. [ 161 for more details).
In this paper, an alphabet consists of a set of constant, functor and predicate symbols. A term t is either a constant, a variable or a compound term f( tt , . . . , tn) composed of an nary function symbol f, and n terms t;. An atom is a logical formula of the form
. , t,,), where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and ti are terms. A literal is an atom or the negation 1A of an atom A. Atoms are positive literals, and negated atoms are negative literals. In propositional logic, no terms are considered. Thus in propositional logic, all predicates have 0 arity. In computational learning, one often employs CNF formulae, which are of the following form: Interesting subsets of clausal logic, are Horn (respectively de$nite> clause logic. They consist of CT expressions that have at most one (respectively exactly one) positive literal in each clause.
Interpretations are used to formalize truth and falsity of specific formulae and entailment. As we use only clausal logic, we will focus on so-called Herbrand interpretations, which can -for our purposes -be defined as sets of variable-free (i.e. ground) atoms over a given alphabet. According to a Herbrand interpretation all atoms in the interpretation are true, and all other atoms (over the alphabet) are false. In the propositional or boolean case, a Herbrand interpretation corresponds to a variable assignment, i.e. a truth assignment to the propositional atoms which are the "variables" of the formula.
A substitution 6 = {K + fl,. . . , V,, + t,,} is an assignment of terms tt,. . , t, to variables VI,. . . , V,. The formula FB where F is a term, atom, literal or expression, and 0 = {v, +-I], . . , v, t tn} is a substitution, is the formula obtained by simultaneously replacing all variables Vi,.
, V, in F by the terms ft,. . . , t,,. A clausal theory T is true in a Herbrand interpretation I if TO is true in 1 for each substitution 8 for which TB is ground. A ground clausal theory T8 is true in I if and only if each clause of TO is true in I. A ground clause is true in I if one of the atoms that appears positively in the clause is true according to I or one of the atoms that appears negatively is false according to I. For example, JEies V Third V wbnormal is true in the interpretations Gflies}, {abnormal} but false in {bird,abnormal}. If a theory is true in an interpretation we also say that the interpretation is a model for the theory.
Logical entailment and satisfiability are typically defined using interpretations. We will write F /= G (read F logically entails G) when all models of F are also a model for G, and F b 0 (read F is not satis$able) if there exists no interpretation that is a model of F.
Concept-learning
In concept-learning [22] , one is given a language of concepts Lc, a language of examples L,, the covers or membership-relation EC that specifies how Lc relates to Le, and a set of examples E of an unknown target concept t E Lc. Each Another logical setting originates from the work on PAC-learning [ 7,301. In learning from interpretations, hypotheses are clausal theories, examples are Herbrand interpretations and an example is covered when it is a model for the hypothesis.
Definition 3 (Learning from interpretations).
If H is a clausal theory and e a Herbrand interpretation, then H covers e under interpretations, notation e pi H, if and only if e is a mode1 for H. When learning from interpretations, it is implicitly assumed that each example is completely specified. Indeed, in propositional logic, all propositions should be either true or false. As a consequence, missing values cannot be represented in this framework. It has therefore been suggested by [ 1 l] to represent examples by partial interpretations. In a partial interpretation, certain ground atoms have an unknown truth-value (see below for a forma1 definition).
Alternatively, [ 121 employs a second-order logic for dealing with this situation.
A generalization of learning from partial interpretations, called learning from sati@-ability, is defined below.
Definition 5 (Learning from satisjability)
. If H and e are both clausal theories, then H covers e under satisfiability, notation e E, H, if and only if HA e # 0.
Example 6. Let the examples be ({bird t; normal +-$es +-}; true), ({birdvjies +-; normal c}; true) and ({bird t; normal t; +-jies};false).
Then flies +-bird ~norrnal is a solution.
This notion of coverage (using the membership function E,) was proposed by [ 3 11. However, [ 3 11 did not choose full clausal logic to represent examples and hypotheses. Yet, this choice is essential for our purposes.
Whereas learning from entailment and learning from interpretations are well-known and well-motivated in the literature, we still need to answer the question as to Why learning from sutisfiability is useful? A first and tentative answer is that learning from satisfiability seems the most general setting possible within clausal logic as both examples and hypotheses are clausal theories. We will soon show that the other settings defined above indeed reduce to learning from satisfiability.
Relation among the different settings
We will now investigate the relation between the different formalizations of conceptlearning in logic using the concept of a solution-set: Definition 7. sol,(E) = {H 1 H is a clausal theory over a given alphabet such that for
all (p, true) E E: p E, H and for all (n,fulse) E E: n & H}
To investigate how one type of coverage notion relates to another type of coverage, we use reductions: 2
Definition 8. A reduction from learning under E, to learning under E, is a function p that maps any example set E (under E,) onto an example set Ep = {p(e) 1 e E E} (under E,) such that sol,(E) = sol,. (E,) .
If there exists a reduction p from learning under ~~ to learning under E,, we can solve learning problems under E, using the algorithms for E,. One merely has to map the example set E to Ep and run the algorithm under E,. The solutions generated under E,, will also be solutions under E,. We can then consider learning under E, a harder or more general task than learning under E,. Obviously:
Property 9. lf there exist reductions from learning under E, to learning under E, and from learning under Ed to learning under E,, then there exists a reduction from learning under E, to learning under Ed.
Some of the reductions will represent Herbrand interpretations by clausal theories as follows: 3 Definition 10. Let i be a Herbrand interpretation in which tl, . . . , t, are the true facts, and fl , . . . , fnl are the false facts. Then 7 denotes the clausal theory { tl c; . . . ; t, t; +ft;...;+fn,}.
*When talking about reductions, it will always be assumed that the language of concepts (including the alphabet) is fixed. This assumption is needed because some of the reductions studied below change the alphabet of the examples (using skolems).
One property of this transformation that follows directly from Proposition 3.2. in [ 211 and that will be used in some of the proofs, goes as follows: Property 11. Let H be a clausal theory and i be a Herbrand interpretation. Then i is a modelfor H iffir\H #O.
Let us now investigate the relation among learning from entailment and learning from satisfiability.
Theorem 12. Learning from entailment reduces to learning from satisjiability. This theorem shows that learning from entailment is to be considered a special case of learning from satisjiability. The converse does not seem to hold, as clausal theories cannot in general be transformed into single clauses.
Consider now the relation among learning from interpretations and learning from entailment:
Theorem 13. Learning from finite interpretations reduces to learning from entailment.
Proof. Define p( (e, Class) ) = (+, Xlass), where e is a finite Herbrand interpretation.
The result then follows from the observation that i Ei H iff 75 ge H,' which in turn follows from Property 11. Notice that if i is an interpretation with as true facts tl, . . . , t,, Notice that the converse of Theorem 13 does not hold, as the negation of a clause is not necessarily a (complete) interpretation. It can however be considered a partial interpretation, as some facts will be true, others will be false, and still others will have an unknown truth-value. More formally: a partial interpretation (over an alphabet) consists of a set of true ground facts T and a set of false ground facts F. A Herbrand interpretation I (over the same alphabet) extends a partial interpretation (T, F) if and only if T C I and F n I = 8. ' A skolem substitution substitutes all variables by different constants that are not in the current alphabet. 5 This restriction to finite interpretations is needed to guarantee that the resulting expressions 17 are finite clauses. This is not really a strong restriction, as infinite interpretations cannot be represented explicitly, but see 171.
Definition 15 (Learning from partial interpretations).
If H is a clausal theory and e is a partial interpretation then H covers e under partial interpretations, notation e Eri H, if and only if e has an extension I that is a model of H. 6
As for Herbrand interpretations, Z denotes the clausal theory corresponding to the partial interpretation e. Furthermore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between finite partial interpretations e and clauses 1~. Using this mapping it is easy to prove that: This theorem demonstrates that learning from entailment and learning from partial interpretations are essentially equivalent. Hence, we will not further distinguish among them.
Finally, within inductive logic programming one typically employs also a background theory B in the form of a clausal theory, and regards an example e covered by a hypothesis H only if B A H k e.
Definition 17 (Intensional inductive logic programming).
If H and B are clausal theories and e is a clause, then H covers e under intensional inductive logic programming, notation e Eint. The reduction of intensional inductive logic programming to learning from satisjiability forms another motivation for studying the latter setting.
A special case, frequently applied in inductive logic programming (e.g. the wellknown systems Golem [25] and Foil [29] ) and its computational learning theory formalisation, assumes that the background theory B consists of a set of ground atoms and that the positive examples are true ground atoms and the negative ones false ground atoms. This setting is known in the literature as the extensional inductive logic programming setting.
Definition 19 (Extensional inductive logic programming).
If H is a clausal theory, B a set of true ground atoms, and e a ground atom, then H + (e c B) . 0
Unfortunately, learning from entailment seems not reducible in this manner to extensional inductive logic programming. This is because the above transformation assumes that when learning from entailment all examples have the same condition part. This assumption does not hold in general. Consider e.g. learning p +-q A r from the positive example p t q A r A t and the negatives p c q, and p t r. 7 So far we ignored the fact that many approaches (especially in the domain of inductive logic programming) assume that the examples when learning from entailment are Horn clauses. Let us name this setting Horn-learning from entailment. Trivially, this setting can be reduced to learning from entailment. However, it seems impossible to reduce learning from interpretations to Horn-learning from entailment. The reason is that the clauses S obtained from Herbrand interpretations e, are typically not Horn.
Knowledge representation
The three main settings, i.e. learning from interpretations, from partial interpretations, * and from satisfiability, can also be interpreted from a knowledge representation perspective.
Central to this issue is the question as to what an example represents? The question can best be answered in terms of model theory. In terms of model theory, each example e corresponds to a set of models M(e), and an example e is covered by a hypothesis
H if and only if there is a model m E M(e) that is a model of H. Formally:
Definition 21. If e is a Herbrand interpretation I then M(e) = {I}; if e is a partial interpretation then M(e) = {I 1 I is a Herbrand extension of e}; if e is a clausal theory then M(e) = {I 1 Z is a Herbrand model for e}.
Property 22. e gx H iff 3m E M(e): m is a model for H where Ex=Ei or E,i or &.
This property suggests that the main difference among the three formalizations of concept-learning is due to the models M(e) that an example represents. When learning from interpretations, M(e) contains a single interpretation. By definition, an interpretation assumes complete knowledge. Hence, when learning from interpretations, complete 7 One might want to consider taking as the extensional background theory the union of the antecedents of the examples, and as examples the consequence of the examples. Unfortunately, this does not work (cf. the illustration). To make this approach work, one should also change the representation by adding an extra argument to all of the predicates, This argument would then contain a unique identifier for the example. However, such changes of representation are not permitted within our (strict) notion of reduction.
* Which is considered here to be equivalent to learning from entailment, cf. above.
knowledge about each of the examples is assumed. When learning from partial interpretations, M(e) contains all extensions of the partial interpretations. The difference between the extensions and the partial model is that the extensions assign the value true or false to the facts that have an unknown truth-value in the partial interpretations. Hence, partial interpretations can represent examples with missing values. When learning from clausal theories, M(e) can (depending on the example) contain any set of Herbrand interpretations.
For example, assume that the truth-value of two propositional facts p and q is not known, but it is known that they have identical truth-values. One cannot represent this knowledge using a partial interpretation. However, using the clausal theory p t q and q +-p will realize the desired effect. This example illustrates that learning from satisfiability allows us to express other types of incomplete knowledge.
This knowledge representation view provides guidance for choosing the right setting when modelling an induction task. 
Computational learning theory
The PAC-learnability of several subclasses of clausal logic has been investigated under various membership relations. We first formalize the PAC-learning paradigm introduced by [30] , and then investigate the role of the membership relation for PAClearning.
PAC-learning: dejinition
Let LC be a class of concepts. The target concept t may be any concept in Lc. A learning algorithm for Lc is an algorithm that attempts to construct an approximation to the target concept from examples for it. The learning algorithm takes as input two parameters: the error parameter e E (0, 1 ] and the confidence parameter S E (0, l] . The error parameter specifies the error allowed in a good approximation and the confidence parameter controls the likelihood of constructing a good approximation.
The learning algorithm has at its disposal a subroutine EXAMPLE, which at each call produces a single example for the target concept t. The probability that a particular example e E L, (positive or negative for t) will be produced at a call of EXAMPLE is D(e), where D is an arbitrary unknown but fixed distribution on L,. The choice of the distribution D is independent of the target concept t.
Concept g is a good approximation of concept t if the probability that f and g differ on a randomly chosen example from L, is at most E, i.e. D(tAg) < E, where tAg = t -g U g -t. Putting all of the above together, we obtain the following definition. A calls EXAMPLE, which returns examples for some unknown but fixed t E Lc. The examples are chosen randomly according to an unknown but fixed probability distribution D on L,. For all concepts t E LC and all probability distributions D on Le, A outputs a concept g E Lc, such that with probability at least ( 1 -S), D( tAg> < F. The time complexity of A is bounded by a polynomial p( l/c, l/&m, size(t)) where m is the size of the largest example, and size(t) the size of the target concept. A class LC is PAC-learnable under EC if there exists an algorithm A which is a PAClearning algorithm for ( Lc, L,, EC).
Notice that the membership functions & considered in this paper completely determine the language of examples L, used. Hence, we say LC is PAC-learnable under EC instead of LC is PAC-learnable under EC for the language of examples L, corresponding to EC.
To prove PAC-learning results, one frequently relies on so-called PAC-reductions introduced by [28] (cf. Chapter 7 of [ 191) . We will only consider a special type of PAC-reduction, which can be derived from the above introduced notion of a reduction:
Definition 24. A reduction p is efJicient if and only if size(p(e)) is bounded by p(size(e))
where p is a polynomial and p can be computed in polynomial time.
When learning under t, efJiciently reduces to learning under E,, we will write that E,~E!. It is clear that 9 is also transitive.
It is straightforward to prove that all reductions used in the proofs of theorems in Section 3, are efficient when natural and comparable size measures are used. 9
Thus the main result of this paper is:
Theorem 25. EfJicient reductions
(4)
Learning from _/kite interpretations and extensional inductive logic programming eficiently reduce to learning from entailment; Learning from entailment eficiently reduces to learning from finite partial interpretations, and vice versa, Learning from entailment and fromJinite partial interpretations efJiciently reduce to intensional inductive logic programming, Intensional inductive logic programming eficiently reduces to learning from satisjability.
YThis implies that when learning from interpretations, the size of an interpretation takes into account (i.e. sums) the sizes of the set of true and the set of false facts, which contrasts with [ 71, who take into account only the size of the true facts, Using the sum is necessary because the reduction from Ei to e.g. EC results in clauses that contain both true as well as false facts.
In graphical form Theorem 25 yields:
This result is important in the light of PAC-learning because:
Theorem 26. If there is an e$'icient reduction from learning under E, to learning under E? and LC is PAC-learnable under E!, then LC is also PAC-learnable under
Ex.
Proof. This follows from the observations that ( 1) if there is an efficient reduction from learning under E, to learning under Ed then (Lc, L,, E,) PAC-reduces to ( Lc, L,, E,.); and (2) 
PAC-learning and logic
Computational learning theory has investigated the learnability of several classes of logical hypotheses, under various coverage notions.
First, k-CNF, the class of all CNF formulae that contain at most k literals per clause [30] , and jk-CT, the class of all CT formulae that contain at most k literals of size at most j per clause [7] are efficiently PAC-learnable from interpretations (both from positive and from positive and negative examples). We will now show that k-CNF is not efficiently PAC-learnable under entailment. Though one might consider learning k-CNF under entailment inappropriate from a PAC-learning point of view as membership testing under entailment is NP-hard, this theorem does show that learning k-CNF under entailment is not PAC-reducible to learning k-CNF under interpretations. This in turn suggests that learning under entailment is not only more general but also computationally harder than learning from interpretations.
Theorem 27. k-CNF is not ejficiently PAC-learnable under entailment,for k 2 3.
"'Though the usual definition of PAC-reduction requires that the instance mapping maps positives onto positives and negatives onto negatives (and hence that concept-membership is preserved, it is easily proven that result (2) also holds when positives are mapped onto negatives and vice versa (and hence that negated membership is preserved), cf. the proof of Theorem 7.2 in [ 19 I.
Proof. Due to the results of [27] it suffices to show that finding a solution to the learning problem (the so-called consistency problem) is NP-hard. The consistency problem can be used to solve the well-known NP-hard 3-SAT problem. 3-SAT is the problem of determining whether a 3-CNF formula is satisfiable or not.
Consider a 3-CNF formula T = r\yL, (/;,I V Z;,2 V li,3) over IZ propositional predicates.
Consider the equivalent learning problem, where P = {lL,l V li.2 V li,~ ( 1 < i < m} and N = {0} (where the only negative example is the unsatisfiable clause).
We still have to prove that the 3-CNF formula is satisfiable if and only if the learning problem has a solution: if the learning problem has a solution H, then H b T and H # 0, therefore T # 0; if T is satisfiable, then the learning problem has a solution, Finally, Horn-CNF, the class of CNF formulae that are Horn, are learnable using membership and equivalence queries from interpretations [ 1 ] and from entailment [ 151. This also means that they are PAC-learnable if membership questions are available. " At present, it remains an open question as to whether these results can be upgraded towards restricted sets of first order logic and whether they would carry over to learning under Eint.8 or Ed. On the other hand, due to the equivalence of & and Eri, Horn-CNF should be learnable in the same manner from partial interpretations.
Related work
The presented work is related to and motivated by some of the results by [2] and [ 151 who study the relation between learning from entailment and learning from interpretations when membership and equivalence queries are available. However, our results do not assume that queries are available.
Secondly, our results are also related to those by [ 3 1 ] who study the relation among several inductive logic programming settings. In particular, they studied the influence of testing coverage at the local level (i.e. representing each example by a separate logical theory) or at the global level (i.e. representing the example set as a whole by a single logical theory), and the differences between predictive and descriptive inductive logic programming.
Wrobel and Dieroski also propose to use E, to test for coverage (in one of their settings). However, they did not specify the language of examples and hypotheses, which is crucial for obtaining our results. From this point of view, the main novelty in learning from satisfiability is the use of full clausal theories to represent hypotheses and examples.
Finally, several of our results relate to Peter Flach's inquiry into the logic of induction [ 12-141. Flach's work provides a normative semantic account of inductive reasoning in which meta-rules are used to describe various properties of inductive reasoning. Flach distinguishes explanatory from confirmatory induction using these meta-rules. Explanatory induction is related to learning from entailment, whereas confirmatory induction is closer to learning from interpretations or learning from satisfiability. The main difference between Flach's work and ours, is that Flach assumes that the example set is represented by a single logical theory, whereas in our framework each example corresponds to a logical formula. This is important as in Flach's work positive as well as negative examples are handled identically (though a positive example would be a true clause, and a negative one the negation of a clause). This not only complicates the logic I2 but also makes it hard to view Flach's setting as concept-learning, because the latter is typically concerned with positive and negative examples as well as with classification. This is further illustrated by Flach's notion of learning from satisfiability, which requires that H A E # 0 where E is the complete example set. Flach views this as confirmatory induction, of which the prime characteristic is that it is not classification oriented. Our framework shows that it is feasible and interesting to adapt this notion for classification-oriented concept-learning.
Conclusions
Our results allow us to formulate answers to the open questions in the introduction. First, the relation among learning from interpretations and learning from entailment, raised in various forms within computational learning theory and inductive logic programming [ 7, 8, 15, 24, 3 1 ] is now clarified. Secondly, whereas attribute value learning techniques have mostly learned from interpretations and inductive logic programming from entailment, our results indicate that even in the propositional case inductive logic programming is more general and harder (as illustrated by k-CNF). Thirdly, the result on k-CNF indicates that the normal inductive logic programming setting (as formalized in learning from entailment) is computationally harder than the non-monotonic setting (as formalized by [ 71). This last contribution confirms some of the earlier intuitions about the differences between the non-monotonic setting and normal inductive logic programming as formulated by e.g. [8, 24] and between weak and strong induction [ 121. I2 To require that negative statements are entailed, Flach needs to rely on non-monotonic logic. Furthermore, negative examples are sometimes added to the background theory, which seems counter-intuitive.
Finally, we also leave open a number of questions. First, about learning under satisfiability, one may wonder whether there exist still reasonable classes that are learnable and also, what algorithms can be used to do so. Some of the latter issues are addressed by [ 51. Second, our main results concern full clausal logic, whereas in practice one mostly considers Horn logic only. As a consequence, if one requires that examples are Horn-clauses when learning from entailment, then the relation to learning from interpretations is less clear. Third, within inductive logic programming, most of the learnability results (see [ 31) are very specific within our framework as they concern G~~,B. Furthermore, though they typically assume a bound j on the arity of predicates in the background theory, they do not impose a bound on the arity of the predicates to be learned (because otherwise the learning task is considered trivial). An alternative would be to simply employ learning from entailment with one size measure on the length of clauses (and the possibility of also using bounds on the arity of predicates to be learned). This type of learning has been addressed by the algorithmic learning theory community (cf. [ 18,23,26] ) 
